In this paper, we analyze the relationship b& tween probability and Spohn's theory for rep resentation of uncertain beliefs. Using the in tuitive idea that the more probable a propo sition is, the more believable it is, we study transformations from probability to Spoh nian disbelief and vice-versa. The transfor mations described in this paper are different from those described in the literature. In particular, the former satisfies the principles of ordinal congruence while the latter does not. Such transformations between proba bility and Spohn's calculi can contribute to
Introduction
In [19, 20] Spohn describes a non-probabilistic theory for epistemic belief representation. One notable ad vantage of this theory compared to probability theory is in representing the notion of plain belief that is sup posed to be deductively closed. The deficiency of prob ability theory to do such a job has been demonstrated by the well-known Lottery Paradox that describes the situation in which each of a million lottery players has no practical chance to win the jackpot, nevertheless, one among them will surely win. Another nice feature of Spohn's theory is its naturally defined concept of conditionals which is similar to its probabilistic coun terpart in many aspects. Hunter [9] and Shenoy [13] exploit that structural similarity to implement Spohn's theory using computational architectures traditionally used for probability such as valuation networks and Bayesian networks. From a theoretical perspective, on one hand, Dubois and Prade [4] observe that the basic representation in Spohn's theory, the disbelief function, can be interpreted as the negative of the log arithm of a possibility function. On the other hand, interpretation of disbelief values as infinitesimal proba bilities makes Spohn's theory tightly related to Adams' study of E-semantics for default reasoning [1] . Thus, Spohn's theory is well positioned in the web of quan titative approaches to represent and reason about un certain beliefs. In the remainder of this section, we shall briefly review the theory and ask questions that motivate the study of Spohn's belief-probability trans formations.
Let n denote a set of possible worlds. For simplicity, we assume n is finite , 1!21 = n. We use w (perhaps with subscripts) to denote a world, i.e. w E !2.
A Spohnian disbelief function {j is defined as a mapping
5: n -t z +
where z+ is set of non-negative integers. {j satisfies the following axiom: S1 min 5(w) = 0.
wEn An extension of {j to the set of all nonempty subsets of n is defined as follows S2 5(A) = min 5(w) for all A<;:; n.
wE A For A <;:; n and w E A, the conditional disbelief func tion 5(w1A) is defined as S3
5(wiA) = 5(w)-5(A).
It is easy to verify that {j ( w I A) is a disbelief function on the (contracted) state space A i.e., it satisfies Sl. Therefore, for any subset of A, axiom S2 can be ap plied to determine the disbelief value. Analogous to probability theory, the conditional degree of disbelief for a set B satisfying B n A =I 0 is defined as S4 6(BI A) = min 6(w 1 A). wEAnB Given disbelief function 6, a Spohnian belief function /3: 2° --+ Z (where Z is the set of whole numbers) can be defined as follows /3(A) = { -6(A) if 6(A) .
> 0 6 (-,A) otherwise.
If one defines "proposition A is believed with degree m(> 0)" to mean /3(A) = m, then it is easy to show that the set of propositions believed with respect to a disbelief function is deductively closed. This desirable property supports the idea of using disbelief functions to represent epistemic beliefs.
To see the similarity between Spohnian disbelief func tions and probability functions, let us list the proba bilistic counterparts for the axioms S1 through S4. A probability function on the set !1 is a mapping
that satisfies following axioms.
P1
l': w E!'l p(w) = 1. An extension of the function p to the set of all subsets of !1 is defined as P2 p(A) = l': w EA p(w) for all A� !1.
The conditional probability function given A is defined for wE A as P3 p(wi A) = *i\l and for B� !1
The pairwise similarity of Si and Pi is obvious. While a qualification w E A is used in the definition of con ditional disbelief function, for probability such quali fication seems unnecessary (for w f. A, p(w i A) = 0). However, if we follow the convention 6(w i A) = oo for w f. A, then even this difference disappears.
Until now, we are satisfied with the suggestion that the value ass igned to a proposition by a disbelief func tion somehow reflects the firmness or strength of (sub jective) belief in that proposition. Although Spohn in [19, 20] used the term "ordinal conditional func tion" instead of "disbelief function" (introduced by Shenoy [13] ), he endorsed the usage of the latter term that bore an obvious intuitive semantic. For the task of constructing a philosophical theory about epistemic beliefs that Spohn clearly engaged in, such an infor mal interpretation of disbelief functions is obviously helpful for exposition but not required as an absolute necessity. Abstract constructs are often sufficient for that kind of purpose. However, for those who want to build (computer) applications, such interpretations are often too abstract to be useful. They have to answer questions such as how to extract a disbelief function from available evidence, data, and human expertise; how to justify the use of one uncertainty calculus over another (for representation of epistemic states) in a specific situation; how to interpret the results or how to make use of results in decision problems. We believe that these concerns of practitioners could be addressed by a further exploration on the relationship between Spohnian disbelief and probability functions.
The first hint of such a relationship has originated from Spohn. He suggests that "A is disbelieved with degree i" ( 6(A) = i) is equivalent to "p(A) is of the same order as Ei" for some probability function p and any infinitesimal E. For the case of uncountable ordinals originally considered in [ 19, 20] , this interpretation of fers an explanation for the minimization operation in the definition of disbelief value for a non-atomic propo sition and the substraction operation in the definition of conditionals. But for a practical situation of a finite state space as we assume here, the condition about the order comparison based on infinitesimals is not very informative even if infinitesimals can be operational ized as close to zero. This approximation, in fact, has been used in [2, 8] by Darwiche and Goldszmidt, and Henrion et a!.
The operationalization of infinitesimals by close-to zero numbers creates another problem. That is, such transformations may lead to counter-intuitive conse quences. The intuition that is at risk is the mono tonicity of disbelief values relative to probability be cause a proposition of lower degree of disbelief is in tuitively conceived as having a higher probability. To clarify the point, let us look at the experimental re sults in [2, 8] . Using E-rule: "if Ek+ I < p(A) :::; Ek then 6(A) = k", the authors apply Spohn's theory and probability calculus with various close-to-zero val ues of E and for many instances of a car troubleshoot ing problem and then compare the fault orderings re sulting from these applications. Because of the men tioned intuition, it is desirable that the orderings of possible faults according to (descending) probabilities produced by probabilistic calculation and (ascending) disbelief degrees produced by Spohn's calculation are the same. However, the results of experiments show that those orderings do not always coincide. For an illustration, let us use the following simple example.
Example:
Suppose we have !1 = {W I , w2, Wg, w4} with a given probability distribution. Using E-rule, we have the following [13, 14, 15] . More striking is the fact that the ax ioms that allow local computation in valuations-based systems [17] are satisfied by poss ibility theory and
Spohn's epistemic-belief theory. This observation al lows one to develop a expert system shell that offers a-la-carte calculi for reasoning under uncertainty [16] .
But a problem remains. Although the system has a common computational engine for different calculi, it is still not a genuine combination of these calculi. The system requires a user to pre-select a calculus and then lets the user construct a knowledge base and interpret the results within that calculus. So, a transformation between probabilistic and non-probabilistic calculus that will enable a dynamic exchange inside the system is highly desirable. For example, using Spohn's notion of plain beliefs we can encode opinions expressed by experts who may feel reluctant to commit to exact nu merical probabilities required by Bayesian networks.
Then, we can combine that kind of information with statistical data using probability, make inferences with the combined data, and interpret the results in the cal culus most convenient to users.
2

From Probability to Spohnian Disbelief
In this section, we shall consider the problem of finding transformations from probability functions to Spohnian disbelief functions. Using the relationship pointed out by Dubois and Prade [4] that a disbe lief function can be interpreted as a the negative of the logarithm of a possibility function, we can use this mapping to go from probability to possibility and vice versa.
Denote by P the set of probability distributions over set n and .6. the set of Spohn's disbelief functions over the same set. We consider the transformation T:P-+.6.
(1)
As discussed in the previous section, it is difficult to explain the exact semantics of Spohnian disbeliefs.
For example, how can one interpret the statement "a proposition A is disbelieved to degree n". But we do know that the values of a disbelief function are used to rank propositions. So, it is reasonable to suggest the following principle.
Definition 1 (Principle of ordinal congruence I)
Transformation T is said to satisfy the principle of ordinal congruence if 'ip E P and 'i A,
In plain language, the principle of ordinal congruence says that the more probable a proposition is, the less disbelievable it should be. This principle is similar to that used by Dubois et a!. and Delgado and Moral in considering consistent possibility to probability func tions [3, 6] .
Note that the set of congruent transformations is not empty. A trivial transformation that matches every probability distribution in P to the vacuous disbelief function o is obviously a congruent transformation.
The vacuous disbelief function o on 0 is defined as 'iw E 0, o(w) = 0.
Since the cardinality of [0, 1] -the range of a probabil ity function -is uncountable, I PI is also uncountable. Similarly, we know that 1.6.1 is countable because I NI is countable. So, the transformation T is many-to-one.
Comparing a probability distribution and its associ ated Spohn's disbelief function, notice that T is a "coarsening" process. For probability, it is poss ible that each subset of n has a distinct probability i.e. 2n subsets have 2n different values. As a simple exam ple, consider the probability distribution p such that p(w;) = 2-i . Z where i is the subscript of w;, an arbi trary labeling of the elements of n, and z is the nor malization constant. It is not difficult to show that
. For mally, if we define Cx = {A <:;:; Olp(A) = x }, then l {xiC x =/ 0}1 � n. We can show that the equality hap pens if and only if p(w) = � for all wE 0. In contrast, because of the minimization operation, it is evident that the number of levels a Spohn's disbelief function 6 has on the set of subsets of n is less or equal to n.
The equality happens only if the degrees of disbelief for singletons are all distinct. Therefore, a transfor mation from probability function to disbelief function will match each level of the latter to one or more levels of the former.
Intuitively, the larger the number of levels an uncer tainty measure has, the more informative it is. Obvi ously, o is the most coarse disbelief function. We for malize this intuition by a definition. Denote by IT(p) I the number of levels T(p) has on 2° i.e. l{xl3w E !1, T(p)(w) = x}l.
Definition 2 Let T1 and T2 be two transformations.
We say T2 is coarser than T1 if IT1(p)l � IT2 (P) I for all pEP
Because we want to use a measure of uncertain be lief to differentiate among propositions we shall set our goal to find a least-coarse congruent transforma tion. We need the following definition to give an upper bound for the number of levels produced by a congru ent transformation.
Definition 3 {Leap indices) For a non-increasing sequence Q of numbers q1 2: q 2 2: ... 2: qn, the leap index set Lq is defined as Lq = {ilqi > �J=i+l qj } .
In this definition, n, the index of smallest element of Q, is not a leap index. Informally, an index will be included in the leap set if the "mass" associated with that index is (strictly) greater than sum of those as sociated with all following indices. In general, from a set of numbers {qi} we can arrange them in more than one non-increasing sequences. Therefore, we can have more than one leap index set. For example, if qi = qi then qi and qi can swap their positions in a non increasing sequence to obtain another non-increasing sequence. However, it is easy to show that the car dinality of Lq is independent of such rearrangement, and therefore, it is a characteristic for the set { qi}· We also note that the cardinality of a leap index set can range from 0 (for example in case qi = qi for different i,j) to l{qi}l -1.
Lemma 1 If T is a congruent transformation then IT(p) l :::; ILp l + 1.
Proof: Let IL P I = m. Suppose to the contrary that 
% r is disbelief counter, initially equal 0.
% M is remaining mass, initially equal 1. M=1
In other words, this simple algorithm runs once through n in the descending order of probabilities.
Initially, the most probable world ( w1) gets disbelief degree 0. Disbelief degree counter increases by one at each leap index. We have the following theorem. 
From Spohnian Disbelief to Probability
In this section, we shall consider the reverse problem, given a Spohnian disbelief function 8, how can we de fine an "equivalent" probability function. Such trans formations are called for if we are to make decision based on the ordinal information provided by disbe lief functions and also wish our decision making be immune from attacks of the Dutch book argument.
Snow [18] studies a transformation from qualitative probability to ordinary (quantitative) probability for the same reason. In short, we shall consider functions Similarly, we have for 0 :::; i :::; s
where Pi denotes the average probability of the worlds in !1;.
Given that disbelief function 8 is the only relevant in formation in the construction of a probability func tion, the probabilities assigned to the worlds having the same disbelief values must be the same, and hence equal to their average. This leads to the following def inition.
where Z is the normalization constant.
From Definition 6, it is evident that probabilities are assigned to the worlds asymmetrically in the sense that the probability value ass igned to a world believed with degree i depends only on less disbelieved worlds (with disbelief values less than i) and not on those that are more disbelieved.
The second observation is that if ko = k1 = ... k, = k then probability of a world disbelieved with degree i has a very convenient form P i = (k + 1)-i .z . In other words, if we assume an "uniform" distribution of dis belief i.e. IOol = lOti = . . . 10.1 = l!}L then probability and degree of disbelief are related through an expo nential (or logarithmic) law.
The third and maybe the most interesting feature of transformation 8 is its sensitivity to just the ordinal in formation contained in a disbelief function. It is noted that there is an infinite number of disbelief functions that are equivalent in terms of ranking possible worlds because a disbelief degree can be any natural number. We can identify a "canonical" element of such a class by the following densification operator. Informally, if we view a disbelief function 6 as an ar rangement of the set of possible worlds into strata Oo, !11 and so on where 0; = {w E Ol6(w) = i} then, what densification does is removing the empty strata and then shifting down the higher ones. Clause (1) ensures that as far as the ordinal order among worlds is concerned, a disbelief function and its densified ver sion are equivalent. In terms of vector (ko, k1, ... , k,), a dense disbelief function is one that does not have any k; = 0. It is easy to see that we can not make 8 change the probability assigned to the worlds in n by inserting a number of zero strata into a disbelief function.
Now we will show that transformation 8 congruent.
First, we need a simple lemma.
Lemma 2 Let p = 8(6) and G; = {wl6(w) > i}. If 6(w) = i then p(w) > p(G;).
Proof: For i = s-l, we have Gs-1 = {wl6(w) = s} where For each w E G s-l we have
Similarly, by backward recursion, we can prove for all i, if 6(w) = i then p(w) > p(G;).
• Theorem 2 The 8 defined above is a congruent Spoh nian disbelief to probability tmnsformation function.
Proof: Suppose 6(C) < 6(D) where C and D are subsets of 0. Let 6(C) = i, by axiom S2, there is a wE C such that 6(w) = i.
• From the proof of Lemma 2, we can verify that the replacement of a denominator (k; + 1) in the defini tion of 8 with a greater number would leave the trans formation congruent. Therefore, we can restore the exponential relationship between probability and dis belief degree, as suggested by Spohn, by choosing one denominator kmax where km ax = max k;.
0:5i:5s
Thus, another transformation T' can be defined such that for p' = T'(6) and 6(w) = i, p'(w)
So, what is the difference between transformations given by equations (6) and (7)? and what is the ratio nale for choosing (6) over (7)? One answer is that the former gives less skewed distribution. To see that let us compare the ratios � and � where p = 8(6)
and p' = T'(6) and Wt,W2 En. It is easy to show
In a sense, transformation 8 describes a more cautious attitude by allocating to less believed possible worlds the maximal probability that is permitted by the prin ciple of congruence.
Although equation (6) gives a point-valued probability for a possible world disbelieved with degree i, in gen eral, for a (non-atomic) proposition disbelieved with degree i what we can infer from the transformation is a range of probabilities. We have the following.
Corollary 1 Assuming transformation S, for a dis belief function 6 represented by vector (ko, k1, ... , k,), the following statements are equivalent While probability to disbelief function transformation is a coarsening process that trades preciseness for com putational simplicity, the reverse transformation gives the impress ion that it imposes unsupported precise ness. It is also evident that S is not the inverse of T i.e. in general we have S(T(p)) -:J p . In fact, because P and 6. are of different cardinalities, we should not expect to find such a inverse pair of transformations, nevertheless we have T(S(6)) = 6 provided 6 is dense.
Because Spohn's definition of deterministic believabil ity (or acceptance) of a proposition by the (set the oretical) inclusion of possible world disbelieved with degree 0, another use of transformation S is in find ing the acceptance threshold with the property that the set of higher-than-threshold probability proposi tions is deductively closed. For example, a prob ability function transformed from disbelief function with vector (ko, k1, ... ) sets the acceptance threshold at k:'J-1 . It is worth noting that while the Lottery Paradox establishes that there is no a priori threshold that guarantees deductive closure of the set of higher than-threshold probability propositions for all proba bility distributions, given the probability distribution as above, the threshold k:'j_ 1 establishes a cut point of acceptance if we insist that the acceptance relation be closed under logical conjunction. Any calculus designed to deal with uncertain beliefs has to provide a rule for belief revision due to new information. Such a rule maps an epistemic state to another. Traditionally, for this purpose, Bayes' rule of probability conditioning or its variations are used. But conditioning is not the only rule of belief revi sion. Lewis [11] proposed an alternative rule called probability imaging. For Spohn's disbelief function, conditioning is defined by axiom 83.
In the previous sections we proposed some transforma tions that allows one to shift from one calculus to an other, which hopefully, maintains the essence of infor mation. The shifting of calculi creates new problems.
Once the same body of information can be represented by different functions and each of them has their own rule for revision in the face of new information, how can we ensure that those revised functions are con gruent? In other words, the proposed transformations would be less useful if they did not maintain some kind of consistency with respect to belief revision rules in the different calculi. We will show that they in fact do.
Suppose originally we have disbelief function 6, and after observing evidence (in the form of a proposition) A, and applying Spohn's rule of conditioning we get 6'. Further, suppose 6 was transformed to probability function p by S. Having observed A, we can condi tion p on the proposition and get p'. We will show that T(p') is almost the same as 6'. The result on con sistency of the transformation rules T and S can be summarized in the following scheme. Let o(w) = i, so o(w') > i. Recall notation G; ={wE UJ6(w) > i}. Let 8(6) = p, by lemma 2, we have p(w) > p(G;). We can rewrite
6(w)>i
Note that for those wE G; nA, p(wJA) = �fA:l and for w ¢ G;nA, p(wJA) = 0. Sofromp(w) > p(G;), we have :!:4\ > p(�(A)) or using notation of conditional proba bility p(wJA) > p(G;nAJA). This is the condition to in crease rank parameter in definition ofT. So, applying transformation T for probability function p(.JA), we shall have T(p(.JA)(w) < T(p(.JA)(x) for all x E G;nA.
Because of assumptions o(w') > i and w' E A, we have w' E G; n A. Thus, T(p(.JA)(w) < T(p(.JA)(w').
• Similarly, we can prove a result similar to Theorem 3 for the alternative method of probability updating, namely, Lewis' imaging. Lewis [11] motivated his for mulation of probabilistic imaging from the fact that conditional probabilities are not the same as proba bilities of conditionals except for trivial languages. To define an image of a probability function p on a propo sition A, one needs, in addition, a closeness relation among poss ible worlds. After observing A, the mass (probability) that p assigns to a world w ¢A is moved to the world(s) closest to w that is( are) in A. A disbe lief function readily provides a closeness relation. We can define the "distance" between two worlds w1, w2 by Jo(w1) -6(w2)J. That means, having observed A, the mass of a world excluded by that observation will distributed evenly to the remained worlds of its class. Then Theorem 3 stills holds if (.JA) is understood as imaging on A instead of conditioning on A. Proof of that fact is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we describe two transformations from probability to Spohnian disbelief function and vice versa. In a departure from the widely used idea of relating disbelief values to infinitesimal probabilities i.e., E-rule, we adopt the principle of ordinal congruence as the basis for the transformations. Transformation T from probability to Spohnian disbelief is obtained if we couple the principle of congruence with the principle of minimal information loss. Transformation S from disbelief to probability function satisfies, in addition to the principle of congruence, the cautious attitude by allocating to less believed possible worlds the max imal probability that is permitted by the principle of congruence. We show that this pair of transformations are consistent with respect to conditionalization.
In the experimental works using E-rule as probability Spohnian disbelief transformations, a tension is how small should E be. On one hand, the results from [19, 20, 7] say that with an infinitesimal E, reasonings with probability and Spohnian disbelief are congruent.
On the other hand, with E approaching 0, the transfor mation defined by E-rule becomes the trivial, i.e., any strictly positive probability is ass igned disbelief degree zero. The experiments in [2, 8] are set up, partly, to examine the effect of E values on reasoning outcome. Unfortunately, the results of those experiments can not provide an unambiguous answer to that tension. In this paper, considering a transformation class broader than that defined by E-rule, we show that T is the best answer.
The transformation from non-probabilistic calculi to probability helps to connect the theories that lack de cision methods with the rich body of Bayesian decision theory developed for probability.
Another benefit of such a linkage is that it provides se mantics for the values of disbelief functions. For prob ability, we have the semantics of relative frequency and betting rates. A subjective interpretation of the stat& ment "probability of A is p" is the maximum price a risk neutral person would be willing pay to buy a lottery that pays $1.00 if A happens and nothing oth erwise. We do not know of any similar semantics for possibility values or Spohnian disbelief values. Indeed, Dubois and Prade [4, 5] take pains to explain that the information content of the numerical value of a possibility function is nothing but an ordinal ranking. Spohn [20] provides a link between his disbelief func tion and probability. But since this link is not formally stated, it cannot provide a useful semantic for values of disbelief functions via probabilistic semantics.
An advantage of Spohn's epistemic belief theory is computational simplicity. The human mind may not be designed for probabilistic computation. Common sense reasoning may not be probabilistic in nature. These assertions are supported by a large number of empirical studies in decision making [10] . Spohn's the-ory was motivated partly from the notion of repre senting plain belief. On the other hand, a vast body of literature on the principle of maximization of ex pected utility suggested by von Neumann and Morgen stern [21] and Savage [12] tend to support the thesis that rational behavior is based on numerical probabil ities. So the transformations described in this paper offer a bridge between having plain beliefs and behav ing rationally. It also hints at the costs of rational behavior if one starts from plain beliefs.
